Now that a generation of writers has grown up in the era of broadcast television, the medium is having a formal impact on American fiction. Television is affecting the experience of time and its representation in fiction, and changing the relation of the narrative consciousness to the external environment. All this has proved inevitable. As one study says, "People are now born into the symbolic environment of television and live with its repetitive lessons throughout life" (Gerbner et al. 442). There is even an analogous historical precedent in this century: just as the technologies of rail and automobile, dislocating ideas of time and space, contributed to modernist aesthetics, so broadcast television, widespread in the United States since the late 1940s, now makes its presence felt in the very structure of fictional narrative. We need to examine the process by which television, long held to be inimical to the literary text, instead has come to shape fiction of the 1970s and '80s, bringing structural innovations that are not yet adequately understood.
ers now content to watch TV in mass solidarity while their books crumble.
Voices from academe have joined this discussion, reinforcing the bipolar opposition between literature and television. A recent case in point is Wayne C. Booth's juxtaposition of televisual and literary texts. Television, Booth argues, makes immediate and indelible visual impressions but fails to make any "intellectual demands of the kind expected of even the most watered-down philosophical or scholarly text, or of the printed fiction that critics take seriously" (397). In an argument that recapitulates the decades-long normative stance of the literary intelligentsia, Booth identifies imaginative recreation as the hallmark of literature, in which "the action takes place in a country somehow in my head ... [and is] not confined to a box or screen" (390). Booth excoriates television for forbidding reflection, commodifying the deepest human emotions, stereotyping, presenting a specious gift of programs. His reader, not surprisingly, is required to take the side of literature while acknowledging, anxiously, the power of the encroaching televisual medium.
Extending Booth's argument further, Mark Crispin Miller now declares that the controlled commercial monopoly of the television environment has destroyed critical consciousness in the United States (285-331). We are, according to Miller, "boxed-in" and must deconstruct the television text in order to disclose its technological "degradation of experience," its debasement of "public culture," its exacerbation of racial, class, and gender-based animosities (19).
Readers of Booth and Miller may not recognize the extent to which their own structural divisions, presented as givens, cast the tenets of the argument in binary, oppositional terms. Above all, these critics, like their predecessors, construct their argument on the binary opposition between the worlds of television and literature. The epistemic premise consists of two separate and mutually exclusive worlds. Essentially, television and literature designate adversarial principles of puerility vs. maturity, low culture vs. high, entertainment vs. intellectual engagement, frivolity vs. seriousness, contamination vs. purity, robotry vs. critical imagination. These are the battle lines that have continued, uncontested, for nearly forty years. The way the argument has been cast suggests that resolution of the conflict is possible solely in one's maturation. The child held captive by the powerful popular medium will ultimately renounce TV and embrace the intellectual-imaginative complexity of the printed text. As one analyst observes, "We expect children to like tele-vision precisely because they are easily amused and do not know any better, but we also expect them to grow out of it" (Attallah 225). The enlightened adult can be expected to cross the oppositional boundaries, while the boundaries themselves remain intact.
Like so many conflicts, however, this one evidently is being abandoned before it is resolved-and by the very TV-generation erstwhile "children" who in the 1970s-'80s are refusing the old terms of argument. Not that the writers refuse maturity; they are not a generation of video Peter Pans. Rather, they reject the division between the worlds of television and literature. Before examining the nature of that form, however, it is helpful to see in some detail how fiction itself is now arguing that literary and TV texts are conjunctive in the contemporary American consciousness.
One recent novel, Jill McCorkle's The Cheer Leader (1986), presents at length the holistic relation of television and literary texts. It mixes the two freely, even promiscuously, to represent the contemporary consciousness of the writer. In this comingof-age novel, Joslyn (Jo) Spencer, a high school girl, bursts the cocoon of slumber parties and small-town life during a summer involvement with an older boy before she goes off to college. McCorkle's protagonist, an avid reader of classic literary texts, is perfectly positioned to expose the relation of the literary mind to the realm of commercial TV. At home in the world of books, Jo becomes a significant television test case precisely because she is not an unschooled, inarticulate character susceptible of uncritical acceptance of the medium.
In The Cheer Leader, literary and TV culture cohabit comfortably. McCorkle's protagonist is a young woman of words, an aspirant poet who reads Proust, Maupassant, Dickinson. At the same time, her lifelong frame of reference features television. A friend wears a bikini and "I Dream of Jeannie" pants, while a boyfriend looks "as All American as Wally Cleaver" on "Leave it to Beaver." At first sight, Jo's boyfriend-to-be does not have a "Then Came Bronson" ruggedness. "Clearly," she says in an attempt to define herself, "I am not an 'I Love Lucy' nor am I 'That Girl"' (36, 46, 59, 60, 84, 264). These references come interspersed with serious statements on such canonized writers as Chaucer or Plath or Sherwood Anderson or Proust. All comprise one unitary world; there is no disjunction between canonical literary and TV texts.
Moreover, television is embedded in childhood's best memories (and we doubtless can expect more of this in quasiautobiographical fiction of the foreseeable future). Jo recalls childhood wrapped in "flannel jammies," when she would "sit on the floor and let the dog chew on the fuzzy slippers that came last Christmas," and rest her head "on Daddy's knee and watch the gray TV light flicker on the knotty pine paneling, watch every fear of the day dissolve into the gray, into the hum and lullaby" (170). The maternal side of this experience is here too, the late afternoons, "the TV on, black and white, her mother ironing ... [while watching] As the World Turns while she and [her brother] Bobby eat vanilla wafers ... until... her mother is cooking dinner and Andy Griffith is on the TV" (182).
Projecting her future, Jo never repudiates television, never hints at its supersession. Chaucer and "I Love Lucy" exist simultaneously. They are not even juxtaposed, not set in selfconscious relation to each other. True, this kind of consciousness flattens history into one present state. But there is no irony in McCorkle's positioning, no polemic statement about high culture versus the popular. Jo is not slumming in TV reruns.
And she is not, as a poet, devotee of words, planning to put aside, much less to reject, television in adulthood. At the end of the novel, imagining marriage and a young son, to be named Anaximander, she envisions rainy days when "I will roll back my nice oriental rugs and little Anaximander and I will roller skate while we watch old reruns on TV" (265). This projection of the future will be a permutation of her own childhood experience. The fantasy is based on the presumptive pleasure of television. In the consciousness of this poet-protagonist a Greek philosopher namesake and TV reruns coexist in perfect accord. Literacy, literature, intellectual life, McCorkle argues, include popular television. The Cheer Leader is significant here precisely because it shows how TV has been naturalized and how it has entered the contemporary American literary consciousness.
There is a generational issue here. Not every writer who positions a television set in a fictional scene enacts the perceptual traits of the medium. The point seems obvious, its implications perhaps less so. Writers can only enact the values of a video culture from the presumption of their presence within the TV environment. Those psychologically outside of it, typically those who grew up in the years before the TV consoles, table models, and portables proliferated in American households and public places, maintain a very different relation to the medium even when they exploit it in fiction. In order to understand the ways in which younger writers from Ann Beattie onward to Bobbie Ann Mason, Bret Easton Ellis, Peter Cameron, Todd Grimson, among others, are enacting the traits of broadcast television in the very form of their fiction, it is helpful to juxtapose two texts overtly concerned with television. The two, published at about the same time, enable us to see radically different positionings of narrator and reader in television scenes of pre-TV and TVera writers. The first text is the work of John Updike, a pre-TV-era writer who began publishing in the mid-1950s; the other, Bobbie Ann Mason, whose fiction first appeared in the 1980s.
Roger's Version depicts the household of a Protestant theologian, Roger Lambert, whose twelve-year old son struggles with his homework in front of the TV. The narrator watches his son "crouching blurry-eyed over his math homework while trying to keep a rerun of 'Gilligan's Island' in focus," even as both parents talk and intermittently try to help him:
On "Gilligan's Island" a small man with a yelping voice was wearing a sarong and trying to avoid a heavyset blond man who, clad in a splashy-patterned bathing suit, was bombarding him with water balloons from a helicopter.... "Gilligan's Island" momentarily yielded to a commercial. For catfood. A handsome, caramel-colored cat, an actorcat wearing a bow tie, was shown snubbing raw steak and fresh fish and then greedily burying its face up to its throat muff in a dish of gray-brown pellets. (44 48)
In this passage Updike wants it both ways, wants his narrator both to be involved and yet critically detached from the "everyday culture" of TV. He doesn't see Gilligan as a character, much less as the actor Bob Denver, but instead as a small man with a yelping voice in a sarong. Watching the commercial, he does not see Morris the cat but an "actor-cat." Presumably we, the readers, are seeing Gilligan and Morris, but the act of identification, of naming, is left to us, though at our peril. The two television identities are undisclosed, but not to enable us to participate in acts of discovery, acts of identification so characteristic of the implied contract between the writer and reader in fictional narrative. We are not here given indirect clues or information. Rather, Updike intends that his narrator and reader be empowered by a critical distance from the TV environment. We are supposed to be above and beyond all that. Inadvertently, Updike puts us in the realm of that binary opposition, in which our only legitimate response is a detachment that means rejection of the television world. Like the narrator, we are momentary analysts of the TV rerun and the commercial; we are cultural critics superior in our distance. Our very ignorance of the specifics of the TV names is important insofar as it establishes our qualifications as critics. To name names, to say "Gilligan" or "Morris" is to implicate ourselves in the crass, the commercial.
So we are to see a "small man with a yelping voice" and "actor-cat" instead of Gilligan and Morris. We are to suppress those names we know, lest we be complicitous with the popular culture, be mundane participants instead of cultural critics. The only tenable position, intellectually and morally, is the narrator's, authenticated by ignorance of the commercial and the popular. The right readers are a coterie who are beyond contempt for Gilligan and Morris, themselves figures so unworthy of consciousness that the proper reader can only be oblivious. So if it happens that we know their names, we must not speak them even to ourselves. The boy with the homework might do so, but not us. Our credentials as civilized adults depend upon not naming. Unwittingly, however, Updike is caught, because he has named the program and its status as a rerun. His narrative stance really depends upon shunning commercial broadcast TV, and he risks compromising his narrative authority by being forced to admit into the discourse the very terms banished from it. Thus he all but reveals the specifics he would shudder to say, that the young man in the sarong is the immediately recognizable, familiar title character of a sitcom based on an island shipwreck, that the advertisements featuring the finicky cara Here the narrative consciousness, Sam's, is directly involved in the televised segment, which is virtually transcribed, something of a documentary report, though not without criticism. Rivers, Sam observes, is "made up" to look pretty but "isn't really that pretty," and she and her show business guest "rattle" on about their forthcoming appearances. Readers will soon understand that the decision to go to college hangs heavily on Sam, so the Don Rickles statement about his daughter has a personal immediacy and importance. This text, unlike Updike's, does not insinuate two classes of readers, those seduced by commercial television and those who stand above it, i.e., the pure and the contaminated of the binary opposition. Mason nowhere signals her own superiority to the program or criticizes her protagonist for any serious involvement in it. She does not patronize or condescend to her characters. Nor does she invoke a tone of satiric ignorance in order to provide her readers an exit to a promontory of critical distance from the televised scene. We hear nothing, for instance, of a self-deprecating, angular blond stand-up comic who insults other celebrities by satirizing their physical appearance. Quite the reverse. The privileged reader-rather like that of John Dos Passos in the 1920s and '30s-has to know the specific context of popular culture, from the name of a pest control product to the identities of Rivers, Don Rickles, Boy George, and the hardbitten Willie Nelson. The text presumes the authority of the world of commercial broadcast television. It can be reported, transcript-fashion, because it needs no explication. No distinction between the mature and the puerile hinges on knowledge or ignorance of commercial television. Mason is within the television environment and presumes that her reader is also there. And her reader is presumed to stand in the same relation to television as she herself does. Her text is at one with this world of broadcast TV as Updike's is not.
At this point we can examine the formal narrative implication of Mason's stance, one she shares with a number of contemporary TV-era writers. In fact, the ways in which television affects narrative form in the 1970s and '80s may be approached through theorists of the video medium, especially Raymond Williams, John Ellis, E. Ann Kaplan. In the mid1970s Williams, in Television: Technology and Cultural Form, cautioned that television reviewers were misguidedly, anachronistically operating like drama or film critics or book reviewers, approaching individual programs as "a discrete event or a succession of discrete events" (88). Williams, the Marxist social analyst with particular interests in the cultural institutions of print, had been a BBC television reviewer between 1968 and 1972 when he became convinced that forms of broadcasting in the TV age were altering perceptual processes. Prior to broadcasting, Williams observes, "the essential items were discrete... people took a book or a pamphlet or a newspaper, went out to a play or a concert or a meeting or a match, with a single predominant expectation or attitude" (88). The fundamental expectation was of a discrete program or entity.
But increasingly, Williams finds, in the era of television broadcasting the discrete program has yielded to a structure far more fluid. "There has been a significant shift from the concept of sequence as programmingto the concept of sequence asflow." He goes on: "there is a quality of flow which our received vocabulary of discrete response and description cannot easily acknowledge" (93).
Williams's identification of "flow" has proved a benchmark in differentiating the experience of broadcast television from other narrative forms. Conceding that vestigial elements of discrete programs remain intact in the timed units of a "show," he argues nonetheless that the intervals between these units have disappeared. In American broadcast television the advertisements are incorporated into the whole: "What is being offered is not, in older terms, a programme of discrete units with particular insertions, but a planned flow, in which the true series is not the published sequence of programme items but this sequence transformed by the inclusion of another kind of sequence, so that these sequences together compose the real flow, the real 'broadcasting"' (90). Williams then observes that the additional, more recent insertion of trailers and previews of forthcoming broadcasts further contributes to and complicates the flow, and he calls all this "a new kind of communication phenomenon" demanding recognition (91).
Williams's demarcation of flow has been tremendously influential among scholars and analysts of video forms. Every subsequent analyst of the medium of broadcast television has addressed the concept, some with certain modification. Robert C. Allen, in his study of television soap opera, remarks that "the viewer must be encouraged not just to tune in for a single program but to submit to the 'flow' of programming throughout an entire evening" (47). E. Ann Kaplan finds that the principal kinds of programs-soap operas, prime-time dramas, news and game shows-"exist on a kind of horizontal axis that is never ending." She emphasizes that "the fixed and clearly defined boundary of the novel or Hollywood movie" is utterly different from television, which has "neither a clear boundary nor a fixed textual limit" (RockingAround the Clock 4). John Ellis, another analyst of broadcast television, believes that Williams's definition of flow omits consideration of the precisely timed "items" or, in television workers' own parlance, "segments," all demanding "short bursts of attention." In this sense, "flow" is really segmentation without closure, something like an endless string of bright beads (116-19). However much these analysts debate the precise experience of flow, all concur that the experience of television watching is unlike that of theater or film, both of which are bounded and unitary. All uphold the essential idea of fluidity as a dominant trait of television.
Turning to a group of writers cognitively informed by this kind of flow, writers who from childhood belonged to a world which has spent untold hours watching television, the analysts oftelevisual form can prove heuristically helpful. Their concept of flow, applied to TV-age fiction, can help us understand the new fictional structures which otherwise draw censure for their apparent defection from form itself. By implication, Williams and others enable readers to understand that the experience of flow, enacted cognitively in fiction, makes certain formal traits This novel, one is made to feel, could start anywhere. It is not a version of in medias res, a concept which presupposes the Aristotelian structure of beginning-middle-end. It does not work to show symmetry and proportion as, for example, Henry James sought to do. James had worried that the "centre" of The Wings of the Dove "isn't in the middle" and that the middle was really at the end, thus structurally truncating the novel. To express his predicament, he resorts to an image of organic disharmony: "The book, in fine, has too big a head for its body." James's image reveals the depth of his concern for formal integrity, a formal symmetry that the writer could discern and, presumably, the reader, for whom it would properly measure successful fictional form. If James's image reverts to Romantic goals, we can notice that Dos Passos, the industrial machine-age novelist, was equally committed to self-evident structural integrity when he invoked the idea of design in fiction, allying himself with architecture when he called himself the architect of history. Whether referring to organic form or machine-age design, these two writers communicated the importance they attached to evident formal integrity, to discrete and bounded fictional struc- This kind of fluidity involves more than a cognitive privileging of the present, and the enactment of it in the present tense. Writers for whom broadcast television is a lifelong experience are revealing a new relation between the individual and the world, a relation which TV structures, and one based upon, but modifying, the concept of "flow." Christopher Lasch remarks that increasingly impressions of the world come, not from firsthand experience, but from "elaborate systems of communication" which present simulacra of reality (133). The fictional texts tell us something of the contemporary response to that situation and suggest the defenses enacted against it. For television paradoxically divides and multiplies centers of consciousness as the viewer phases in and out of the onscreen TV worlds, all the while adjusting and readjusting to the shifting context of the surroundings.
We can better see this sojourning in another fictional representation, Betsy Byars's novel for children, The TVKid (1976). Here the reader enters directly into the mind of eleven-year old Lennie, who lives with his mother at a motel she owns and runs. As the novel opens, he is hosing down a walk, reminded by his mother that his homework (again, homework, the world of abstract symbols and literacy) must be done: "Aren't you through yet?" Lennie's mother called. Here we participate in Lennie's transit to and from the television world of the game show to that of his mother's demands. The TV program has the higher priority for the boy (the ultimate authorial message in the novel is that television is a poor substitute for human connections of peers and authorities). But in scenes like this there is no critical mediation of an adult; we enter Lennie's consciousness directly, moving with him in the halfhearted search for a pencil and then back again, and yet again to the game show world. We cross and recross to alternative loci. Psychologically, the individual enters the television world, then crosses back for interaction with someone else in the immediate environment, then recrosses to enter the television world again, this time an entirely different one as the program alternates with the commercial.
This alternation defines the so-called viewer as a figure continuously moving, a sojourner, a figure in transit between different TV worlds. This works in several ways. First, each single channel alternates program and commercial sequences, constantly moving the viewer out of one and into the other (e.g. from the game show to Doctor Pepper, from "Gilligan's Island" to the cat food.) Ostensible undivided attention to one channel is really a sojourning in and out of divers worlds, none of which has normative priority over any other.
As we see, moreover, in the fictional representation, the viewer is also pulled away from absorption in TV back into the surrounding habitat. The search for a pencil and the need to respond to a parent force Lennie to cross and recross a cognitive threshold from the habitat to the TV worlds and back again. "I know it's the Grand Am.... I'm looking for a pencil.... the Grand Am, the Grand Am!" Preference may lie as viewer with the TV world, but it is not possible to stay there. Others in the habitat claim attention. To meet the sensory demands, the individual must constantly move, adjust, accommodate, engage, withdraw to move again, etc.
And of course, since the mid-1960s the remote channel changer has made possible a viewer's participation in multiple TV worlds. To flip around the channels, themselves multiplied by the spread of multistation cable television systems, has become a common viewer experience. A press of a thumb takes one instantaneously from one world to another, and on to yet another. Thus the multiple realms within a single channel, compounded by distractions of the habitat and by the proliferation of channels and the hand-held device for channel changingall have created a viewer who is constantly moving and being moved.
No such figure appears in advertisements for television apparatus, which emphasize the power of the viewer to exercise control and choice. TV manufacturers and cable companies present their product and service as empowering the viewer with consumerist choices of sporting events, movies, music videos and sitcoms, not to mention the panoply of products. Their viewer is a figure of enthroned autonomy-discriminating, selecting, acquiring.
The cognitive reality, however, is actually the reverse. Mobility, not stable centrism, is the salient characteristic of the viewer. The structure of broadcast television in fact creates the viewer as sojourner, as a figure in transit. Accordingly, television-era fiction presents us with the protagonist in transit, in almost constant movement. And this movement is often irrelevant or, at best, only incidental to narrative development. It can seem random, defying conventional interpretive expectations of plot development, causal relationships, symbolic meanings, and the rest of fiction's characteristics. In Less than Zero, Bret Ellis's Clay, a southern California college boy, moves from freeway to poolside to bedroom to movie to cafe over and over again. Clay says, Here we confront the conundrum of the writerfor whom television is both the cognitive and the cultural environment.
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continuously offers "truth"; public officials and spokesmen for consumer products proffer endless versions of "the real thing." Beattie's protagonist, the apolitical Charles who earns his living working in a government bureaucracy, watches the evening news and sees former President Richard Nixon. "He looks like a lean old mafioso," thinks Charles, his form of expression unusually direct in this kind of narrative (116). These TV-era characters know that possibilities of seduction and betrayal lie everywhere. Updike expresses the shared view that "television goads them into begging for junk from the moment they open their eyes" (94).
For the TV-era writer, then, assent itself becomes problematic, since it is allied with commercial capitulation. Simply put, to commit oneself to any television realm as essential or authentic is to lose oneself. This is a contemporary, cognitive variation on the siren song: yield to the world of the cat food or the game show automobiles, and you forfeit something of yourself. As a child, Lennie might do so, but in maturity he must not. In fiction, the autonomy of the writer and the text therefore demands a lexicon that responds to television's commercialism without capitulating to it, and, at the same time, remains faithful to the cognitive sojourning within the TV environment.
The anticommercial discursive statement is only a small part of this self-preserving fictional lexicon. Far more significant is the diction that locates the psychological site of individual autonomy. The viewer, struggling to preserve integrity, pulls back when summoned to assent. The transit, the sojourning, brings the individual momentarily to the point of juncture between these many worlds of television and the habitat. Selfpossession becomes possible only at the moment and the place of crossover. Graphically, it is like the point at the center of an asterisk. Experientially, it is a threshold, the juncture between places. The viewer makes cognitive forays into the many television worlds, necessarily retreating to the neutral space of the juncture.
And there, at the point of juncture, a kind of autonomy is possible. To be sure, it is not a form ever acknowledged by broadcast television. Each and every TV world, from the cat food ad to the game show, to "Roots," "Dallas," "MacNeilLehrer," the Iran-Contra hearings, and the shopping network invites assent. Each is a Faustian bargain proffered in miniature. Integrity consists in refusing that assent, in exercising a form of passive resistance. Aggression takes this inverted form, and in TV fiction we must consider the diction that evokes this state of mind.
The terms privileged in this state are those of the tentative, the provisional. These are the terms that signal the effort to maintain integrity. In Todd Grimson's Within Normal Limits ( " (28, 29) . We notice the recurrent phrases-"maybe," "I'm not sure," "probably," "possibly." The tentative, the provisional are the key terms, ones made explicit in the title of Peter Cameron's collection, One Way or Another, a phrase that refuses firm designation even at the cost of signaling moral indifference. These terms signal assent withheld, checked. To say, as some critics have, that this kind of style shows a lack of political, social or personal care or commitment misses the point because it really characterizes that commitment. In the era of commercial broadcast television, the voice of the tentative, the provisional is that of integrity. One analyst of these new writers complains that their prose is "stripped ... of formal awareness of itself" (Newman 25). On the contrary, this is prose exerting its power of self-preservation in the era of commercial broadcast television. Formally, in this sense, such prose is extremely self-aware.
The fictional form of the television aesthetic thus paradoxically enacts the traits of the medium and also rejects them. It resists the political-commercial marketplace summons even as it exploits the fluidity and presentism of the video experience. Ironically, its very resistance has elicited a grammar of the provisional and thereby altered the language of contemporary fiction. Nearly a quarter-century ago, in Understanding Media
